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Abstract: This paper uses the methods of social network analysis to discover the 
structural patterns of cooperation that arose in response to a global human security 
problem.  It does this by mapping compulsory and institutional power relations among 
actors of the construction of a human security transnational cooperative response network
—the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004.  By mapping the 
relationships at the system level of world politics, including individual states as well as 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), transnational nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and/or think tanks, and transnational corporations (TNCs), this paper finds a 
third relation among these actors, namely, structural power.  It also demonstrates how a 
new way of thinking about the constitution of system level world politics can produce 
knowledge not available to traditional methods by finding two striking results: first, the 
role played by an organization cannot always be predicted by reference to its attributes, 
and second, depending on the context, organizations of different types will play similar 
(structurally equivalent) roles.  Finally, this paper compares the network formed in 
response to this disaster with the network that formed after a disaster of similar 
magnitude in the past.
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God is our refuge and strength, a very present help 
in trouble.
Therefore will not we fear, though the earth be 
removed, and though the mountains be carried into 
the midst of the sea;
Though the waters thereof roar and be troubled,  
though the mountains shake with the swelling 
thereof. Selah.
There is a river, the streams whereof shall make 
glad the city of God, the holy place of the 
tabernacles of the most High.
God is in the midst of her; she shall not be moved:  
God shall help her, and that right early.
The heathen raged, the kingdoms were moved: he 
uttered his voice, the earth melted.
The LORD of hosts is with us; the God of Jacob is  
our refuge. Selah.
Come, behold the works of the LORD, what  
desolations he hath made in the earth.
He maketh wars to cease unto the end of the earth;  
he breaketh the bow, and cutteth the spear in 
sunder; he burneth the chariot in the fire.
Be still, and know that I am God: I will be exalted 
among the heathen, I will be exalted in the earth.
The LORD of hosts is with us; the God of Jacob is  
our refuge. Selah.
-- Psalm 46, The King James Bible
Introduction
The words of Psalm 46 clearly illustrate the scope and power of a natural disaster. 
As well as putting in perspective humanity's relative importance in the world, the 
psalmist also implores God's protection and foresees the peace that God's will imposes. 
One such example of peace after desolation occurred in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean 
tsunami of December 26, 2004.  The global response to this regional disaster 
demonstrated cooperation in several different ways, from the marshaling of resources to 
the institutional collaboration to provide assistance to the afflicted.   
The political subject to be explored in this paper is the shape and construction of a 
human security network in a case study of the tsunami disaster response network. The 
patterns of cooperation that arise to meet transnational problems in security will be 
mapped and explained.  
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For the purposes of this investigation, “[t]wo agents cooperate when they engage 
in a joint venture for the outcome of which the actions of each are necessary, and where a 
necessary action by at least one of them is not under the immediate control of the other” 
(Gordenker, et al. 1995). The concept of networks in international relations assumes that 
social structures such as those arising from cooperation matter more in explaining 
outcomes than do individual attributes, and are equally as important as material 
resources.  It assumes that there is no central institution or idea that controls international 
relations (even in a specific issue area).  It also assumes that according to the issue area, 
actor relationships will change.  The unit of analysis will be the network as a whole; at 
the macro level (the system level of world politics), the network consists of the pattern of 
formal and informal interactions between states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 
transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs), 
and individual people.  
The evolution of cooperation to respond to the South Asian tsunami began with 
an event, a tsunami in the Indian Ocean.  The response network that was created was not 
started from scratch, however: there were communities of states, intergovernmental 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations that already existed.  To create the 
response network, not only did these pre-existing groups have to negotiate structure and 
authority amongst themselves, but they also had to incorporate many new groups who 
wanted to assist.
System-level networks seem to be primarily concerned with policy development, 
so the question that needs answering here is “Who makes the decisions?”  For example, 
in the case of the tsunami, this refers to determining the overall shape of the global 
response: would aid offered be coordinated on a state-by-state basis, by an 
intergovernmental agency, or some other actor, or some combination of the above? 
Where was power (the ability to make decisions that are binding on others) exercised?  
Theoretical Context
The theoretical context in which this work is situated is largely within the 
constructivist school of international relations. Unlike realists or liberal institutionalists, 
who would expect states or intergovernmental institutions to take the lead in constructing 
a response to an event or problem, constructivists allow for situations of complex 
interdependence in which other actors, or ideas, may be more important.  
For years, the dominant paradigm in the American academic field of political 
science has been realism, which is now under attack.  Realism depends on power and 
self-interest in survival for explaining the actions of states, which are the units studied. 
Realism, especially structural realism, as defined by Kenneth Waltz (Waltz 1979) says 
that the behavior of functionally undifferentiated states is based on their positions in the 
system – the distribution of power capabilities.  However, this theory leaves out a great 
deal.  For example, realism assumes one type of actor, the state; and one organization 
type for the international system, which absent hierarchy is anarchic.  Structural realists 
assume that anarchy generates a self-help environment, where the paramount interest of 
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the state is survival.  This makes for an elegant model, but it is one that resembles reality 
not in the slightest because it fails to explain how non-state actors in the international 
system, such as intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations, 
affect the system.  The primary anomaly that realism failed to predict was the demise of 
the Soviet Union – a change in power at the unit level which led to a change in the 
distribution at the system level.
This failure has led to a proliferation of theories that attempt to link behaviors 
within the state and behavior between states.  It has also led to theories that attempt to 
define, explain, and predict the behaviors of non-state actors.  The liberal institutionalist 
and constructivist schools of international politics, best exemplified by theorists such as 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (Keohane and Nye 2001) for the liberal institutionalists, 
and Alexander Wendt (Wendt 1995) and John Ruggie (Ruggie 1998) for the 
constructivists, think that international organizations play a role in the way that a state's 
identity and interests are formed.  They do this through the transmission of ideas, the 
negotiation of norms, and the provision of information and expertise.  
Liberal institutionalists also assume anarchy, the primacy of the state as an actor 
at the international level, and believe the state’s identity and interests are given.  They 
believe that cheating between states jockeying for relative advantage leads them to create 
intergovernmental institutions to provide the information, repeated interaction, and so on 
that facilitates cooperation.  For them civil society institutions are separate from, and 
support (or oppose) the state.  Civil society, of which NGOs are a part, is domestic 
society in the liberal institutionalist view, and has a structural effect at the international 
level only through the state.  
Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that the formation of identity and 
interests is not exclusively determined by the distribution of material capabilities (as 
realists say).  They see state and civil society as being socially constituted by each other 
in an ongoing discourse, just as the state and the international structure are constituted. 
In particular, the assumption that constructivists make is that anarchy and power are 
mediated through and negotiated in a particular social context, while international 
interactions and practices affect state interest and identity formation, and therefore 
behavior.1  Behavior in turn can affect the structure of the system, by changing both the 
functions of actors and the distribution of capabilities.  International organizations are 
mechanisms for discourse and therefore for producing changes in identities as well as 
interests (and ultimately, for constructing a new structure).  Until now, constructivism 
has had more use as a theory of the formation of state interests and identities (a theory of 
the unit-level), than as a theory of structure; however, the concept of global governance 
can be used to bring structure back to the argument.  
A key aspect of the rise in global governance is the creation of global networks in 
which not all the actors are governments:
1 For example, a material power like weaponry has to be understood in order to be used as a threat—if 
one’s adversary does not know (or worse, does not care) what the consequences of a nuclear attack is likely 
to be, then threatening them with one is not going to be effective as a deterrent.
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Global governance, which can be good or bad, refers to concrete 
cooperative problem-solving arrangements...It thus refers to the complex of 
formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes 
between and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and 
non-governmental, through which collective interests on the global plane are 
articulated, rights and obligations are established, and differences are mediated 
(Thakur and Weiss 2010).
Global governance as a concept thus emphasizes five components that are 
essential for analyzing contemporary international relations: the level of analysis, which 
is transnational; the issue area under question, such as environment or peace and security; 
the presence of actors other than states; the dynamics of governance itself; and the 
interdependent yet loosely-coupled complex system (rather than simple aggregation) of 
the whole.  The latter three components are what make global governance a network 
concept.
Networks are complex systems (Jervis 1997, Flake 1998), a type of relationship 
between multiple actors.  They are composed of actors who have agency: the ability to 
act and react.  Depending on the framing of the issue area (peace and security, human 
rights, international trade, economic development, and environment are all examples of 
issue areas in world politics), network actors can include states, sub-state governmental 
units (such as a ministry or provincial government), IGOs, NGOs, TNCs, social 
movements, and individuals.2   
Power relations in networks are just as likely as not to be asymmetric.  Hierarchy 
is one possible "configuration" of policy networks, but so are clusters and hubs.  Power in 
a network is thus defined as "the control over strategic rigidities in tight or loosely 
coupled systems, the conditions of entry/exit, inclusion/exclusion/expulsion, membership 
or other adherences, etc." (Marin and Mayntz 1991). 
The state of network literature in American international relations field ranges 
from using network as a mere metaphor to explicit use of social network analysis 
techniques.  Exemplifying this range of analysis are studies on vertical and horizontal 
governmental networks (Slaughter 2004), mapping a transnational network of activists in 
a particular context (Gordenker et al. 1995, Keck and Sikkink 1998), the qualitative effect 
of context on a network of actors (Price 1998), the implications of network topology on 
low-intensity conflicts (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996), and the network topology that had 
developed among global Salafi jihadists (Sageman 2004).  Furthermore, there has been 
much variation in the application of SNA, from studies that use the occasional technique 
to those few (Knoke 1990) that wholeheartedly embrace SNA (Montgomery 2009). 
Generally, the studies have been either qualitative, or focusing on ties between people. 
2 This is in contrast to the definition in Marin and Mayntz: “Policy networks do not refer any longer to 
“networking” of individual personalities, to group collusions, to the interlocking of cliques, elites, party or 
class factions, as in older traditions, but to the collective action of organized, corporate actors, and 
consequently to interorganizational relations in public policy making.”  
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Very little work has been done on relationships between multiple types of organizations, 
even less using quantitative methods.  
For the purpose of policy making in the future (as well as for theory-building in 
the field of international relations) we need to have more accurate pictures of what 
actually happens.  Slaughter’s theory of vertical and horizontal governmental networks 
suggests that these networks, while nested in larger policy networks, will (and should, for 
reasons of accountability and legitimacy) lead the way in any response: they should 
decide what to do and why, and then they should be the ones to do it (Slaughter 2004).  Is 
this what actually happened?  Global governance suggests that other actors like think 
tanks will be equally important in deciding why, and NGOs like Doctors Without 
Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) suggests that the “doing” part, implementation, 
is also heavily dependent on other actors.  Furthermore, if network structures are indeed 
complex, it suggests that actors with similar attributes may play different roles according 
to the frame.  
Human Security
The phenomenon under investigation, a disaster response network, is a crucial 
component in the provision of security.  Security has more than one dimension. 
Traditionally, the question of “security for whom?” was answered “the state.”  And yet, 
this does not fully capture the concept of security.  Starting in the late 1980s, security has 
been redefined to include other dimensions: not only may the threat come from outside or 
from within the community to be protected; but it may be natural or human—it may have 
agency (MacFarlane and Khong 2006).   According to Paris, the basic questions to be 
answered are “security for whom?” and “what is the source of the security threat?” The 
answer to the first question may be either states or other collectivities and individuals. 
The answer to the second question may be either military or nonmilitary, or both (Paris 
2001).  At one diagonal of an imagined matrix there is human security, which is 
protection from environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies, groups, 
and individuals.  At the other diagonal is traditional national security, which is the 
protection of the political community of the state from a military threat.   
It should also be added that the speed at which a threat moves is also critical: it 
may strike with or without warning.    Threats may therefore be imminent, as in a nuclear 
strike, or insidious, as in poverty.  This is a situation that is exacerbated by globalization: 
the Black Plague took years to spread through and decimate Europe; SARS took only 
weeks to appear on the other side of the world.   The source, object, and speed of the 
threat all help to determine what type of policy instrument is used to counter it, and 
especially in the case of transnational threats, may require that different institutions react 
in concert. A network responding to transnational threats to either human or national 
security requires connections and coordination—cooperation between actors.  
Social Network Analysis Methodology
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In order to model global networks, mathematical tools are necessary.  Social 
Network Analysis (SNA) is the best method for exploring the social structures that result 
from global interactions because it makes possible the measurement of interactions, 
rather than of actor attributes.  Network theory is an ontological question; network 
analysis is an epistemological stance. The social network analysis perspective includes 
the following aspects: actors and their ties are interdependent rather than independent, 
autonomous units; ties between actors are channels for the flow of information and 
resources; network ties both enable and constrain actions; and structure is viewed as 
enduring patterns of relations among actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  The most 
important aspects of the social network paradigm are that it is concerned with structure, 
which is relational; it is based on empirical evidence; it is graph theoretical, which is 
visual; and it embodies a formal, statistical model.   
  SNA allows analysis of both the big picture, as well as local conditions. 
Techniques such as blockmodeling in particular can map the way different actors may 
play structurally similar roles in networks (White, et al. 1976, Luczkovich, et al. 2003). 
SNA also allows the tracking of multiple relationships between different types of actors 
and between different levels of analysis, without losing coherence.  By making the 
interrelationships explicit and visible, lack of connection as well as duplication of effort 
can be seen with greater precision, thus allowing decision-makers to concentrate their 
efforts.  A social network analysis may reveal properties of networks that are not visible 
through other methodologies, such as the cutpoint—a node that connects components of a 
graph -- the key actor that connects other actors.  Knowing the structure (which both 
enables and constrains action) allows actors more freedom of agency: knowing where to 
influence is vitally important to being able to exercise influence at all.  Furthermore, 
social network analysis methods allow the dynamic mapping of networks over time.
In order to use SNA, there must be evidence of specific interactions and relations 
among actors.  In the following section, the two power relations measured in this study, 
institutional and compulsory, are explained.
Power Relations
Network terms can be translated into international relations via the measures of 
power in global governance described by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall.  They 
divide types of power into a matrix with two core dimensions: the kinds of social 
relations through which power works, and the specificity of the social relations through 
which power’s effects are produced (Barnett and Duvall 2005).  
The first kind of power, familiar to realists, is compulsory power that represents 
direct control of one actor over another.  This can be measured in network terms in many 
ways: as a regulatory relationship with one party making and enforcing rules, as a 
contractual relationship with an exchange of goods or services for payment, or a 
conflictual relationship with one party using violence against another.  Institutional power 
is more diffuse because actors exert control over others that are socially distant. 
Membership in an alliance, attendance at UN conferences and other types of affiliations 
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are network relations that measure this type of power.  Structural power represents the 
capacities of actors—in other words, what they are depends on where they are in the 
network.  Finally, productive power is the production of subjects through the diffuse 
social relations of discursive practices.  To paraphrase, an actor’s “self” is a creation of 
discourse, or negotiation with and against multiple others.  This can be measured 
longitudinally by process tracing that links diffusion of norms and ideas to actor 
constitution—that is, it is helpful to track the progress of an idea through the network, 
and then look for evidence that the actors’ identities have changed as a result.  
Networks could thus be demonstrated by treaties, executive agreements, and 
interorganization agreements, etc., to share resources and information.  They could also 
be demonstrated by presence at decision-making meetings, and influential publications. 
The evidence of relationships can be quantified and directed.  For example, in the case of 
contractors: the amount of the contract is interval data, and it flows from a source to a 
recipient (not the other way around).  Such information is available in the ReliefWeb 
archives, and elsewhere in the UN, the World Bank, from country databases and 
situational reports, and in contemporary media reports.  This paper maps two types of 
power relations, in hopes of discovering interesting information about the structural 
power relationship.  
For this (admittedly coarse-grained) study, I will be using the following sources 
of network information:  the spreadsheets compiled by the Financial Tracking Service 
(FTS), the global online humanitarian aid database; and the situation reports filed by the 
UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).   The first is an 
instance of the compulsory power of financial contracts, while the second is an example 
of institutional power through the sharing of information.  More information on the 
coding decisions is available in the appendix.
A. The Compulsory Power Relation
The Financial Tracking Service (FTS) is a global, real-time database which 
records all reported international humanitarian aid (including that for NGOs and the Red 
Cross/Red Crescent Movement, bilateral aid, in-kind aid, and private donations). FTS 
features a special focus on consolidated and flash appeals, because they cover the major 
humanitarian crises and because their funding requirements are well defined—which 
allows FTS to indicate to what extent populations in crisis receive humanitarian aid in 
proportion to needs. FTS is managed by OCHA. All FTS data are provided by donors or 
recipient organizations.  Having control over material resources such as money and in-
kind aid gives an organization influence over an organization that is requesting the use of 
the resources—in other words, it gives them a say in how the money is spent.  For this 
purpose, it was also important to count only commitments and contributions, and not 
pledges.  
B. The Institutional Power Relation
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The OCHA situation reports record the activities of the OCHA staff, the UN 
system, and their interactions with states, IGOs, and other civil society actors.  These 
interactions were recorded as undirected ties, because they did not have a beginning and 
end.  They indicate the sharing of information and cooperation to coordinate activities 
that did not have the element of coercion—actors were free to do as they wished if they 
disagreed with the group.  Furthermore, these ties were recorded as dichotomous, and not 
weighted in any way—either two actors cooperated, or they did not.  It was assumed that 
if actors were recorded by OCHA in the same passage (usually a paragraph, but 
sometimes a table), then it was because they were working on the same project and were 
aware of each other’s efforts.  
The Indian Ocean Tsunami
On 26 December 2004, an earthquake that registered magnitude 9.0 (later 
adjusted to 9.3) on the Richter scale occurred just before 8 a.m. off the west coast of the 
Indonesian island of Sumatra.  The epicenter was about 150 miles southeast of Banda 
Aceh. The earthquake occurred when the Indian plate was subducted under the Eurasian 
plate and was the second most powerful earthquake since 1900. The plates moved several 
hundred kilometers at a depth of about thirty kilometers. The vertical plate movement of 
about twenty meters displaced billions of tons of overlying ocean water. The resulting 
tsunami traveled at speeds up to 500 miles per hour. The tsunami hit Indonesia thirty 
minutes later and the coasts of Thailand, Sri Lanka, and India about thirty minutes after 
that.
While the knowledge necessary to predict tsunamis was available, the 
infrastructure and procedures to disseminate it were not. The US tsunami warning center 
in Hawaii issued a local warning about fifty minutes after the earthquake tremors had 
stopped, and there were no early official warnings to South Asia. Most people on the 
beaches or nearby were enjoying a peaceful day after Christmas and were completely 
surprised by the waves tens of meters tall.
The earthquake and the resulting tsunamis spread unprecedented devastation 
across the Indian Ocean, affecting thirteen countries, some as far away as Africa.  The 
waves stripped the land of vegetation and tossed ships about. The destruction to 
buildings, roads, and infrastructure was disastrous, and the tsunami killed more people 
than any other in history—final estimates ranged up to 280,000—and displaced more 
than one million. Ten countries in South Asia (Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Maldives, the Seychelles, and Singapore) and three in east 
Africa (Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania) suffered.
 Viewers across the planet were transfixed by the images of waves swallowing 
islands and cities whole, creating scenes of apocalyptic destruction.  On 26 and 27 
December, the death toll was supposedly in the thousands because the scope of the 
impact was not immediately clear.  As of 17 January 2005, the total death toll was 
estimated at 170,000.  A year later, the total was revised upward to 225,000 (Geist, et al. 
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2006).  Like Hiroshima after the first nuclear bomb was dropped, the devastation was so 
total that in many places there were no survivors left to report the damage.
Thousands of tourists, from the West and the region, were vacationing in the area 
with video cameras in tow.  The video that they shot began to appear on international 
television news programs and on the Internet, allowing the scope of the disaster to 
become clear worldwide.  In previous disasters of similar magnitude, such images would 
not have been available, as they would have been contingent on the technology of 
television and satellites, and the presence of camera crews in the area.  In effect, these 
tourists became their own reporters, cutting out the middlemen of journalism.
The responses by a constellation of relief organizations, national governments, 
militaries, and private individuals around the world illustrate the strengths and 
weaknesses of global governance. An overall response network (states, IGOs, and NGOs) 
was in place, but the creation of the tailored network for the tsunami required negotiating 
a structure among existing groups as well as procedures to incorporate others that joined 
later. 
The initial offers of aid from Western countries were small in comparison to the 
magnitude of the crisis.  For example on 27 December, the United States initially pledged 
$15 million to immediate disaster relief.  Two days later this figure was increased to $35 
million, but it was already clear how inadequate this sum was.  On 28 December, UN 
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland made headlines by 
asserting that industrialized countries had been “stingy” (Regan 2004).  (Egeland later 
clarified his remarks, explaining that most countries define giving in terms of percentage 
of GDP, in which the US lags, rather than total amount, in which the US leads.)
With this statement and acting as the world organization’s emergency relief 
coordinator, Egeland became the public face of the UN for the duration of the crisis.  His 
comments were a bold start.  By having the courage to say what others were thinking, he 
demonstrated clear moral leadership as well as constructivist framing; pushing countries 
into a certain kind of behavior through the power of an idea.  
The Bush administration in particular took umbrage and was obliged to increase 
its pledge tenfold (to $350 million) as well as explain that the US military had already 
created a joint task force in Okinawa, which included the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln carrier 
group and six C-130 cargo transport planes (Waldman and Hoge 2004). The comment 
also started a bidding war within the West to see who could pledge the most aid.  In an 
interview with BBC News and a speech on the House floor, US Congressman Jim Leach 
called it “competitive compassion.”  He noted that what gave the phenomenon a new 
dimension was that this time it was not only competition between governments but also 
between intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (Leach 2005).  For 
example, by the middle of January 2005, the European Union had spent $30 million, had 
pledged $132 million in short-term aid, and $455 million for long-term reconstruction 
(BBC News 2005b).  This was in addition to the amounts that individual governments 
had spent and pledged.
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Considering the lack of warning system and preplanning, the Indian government 
reacted remarkably quickly.  It sent immediate aid to Sri Lanka, as well as mobilized its 
navy to help in rescue efforts in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands, where it also began the task of remapping the ocean floor to allow rescue and 
transport shipping to reach the region.  New Delhi also refused offers of aid for itself, part 
of a demonstration of their power and as bid for a seat on the UN Security Council under 
discussion in the lead-up to the UN’s 60th anniversary in fall 2005.  China also sent aid, 
with one expert stating that the actions of both governments were indicative of their 
worldviews:  both “see themselves as civilizations, as great powers moving forward 
economically in ways that fit their sense of themselves” (Ford 2005).  However, India’s 
refusal to accept aid was also met with skepticism by NGO officials who in the past had 
experienced delays and duplication of effort in similar circumstances.  Oxfam’s 
humanitarian program manager in Delhi worried that the insistence on self-reliance made 
the international aid givers feel both unwelcome and wary about being able to account for 
what aid is accepted (Kremmer 2004).
The Indonesian and Sri Lankan governments, both of which were embroiled in 
armed conflicts with separatist movements, admitted freely that they were overwhelmed 
by the magnitude of the disaster.  In Sri Lanka, where a ceasefire had been in effect with 
the separatist Tamil Tiger movement, authorities on both sides demonstrated a striking 
degree of cooperation in the initial relief phase: dealing with dead bodies, sheltering 
survivors, and providing food and water.  In Indonesia, the separatist Free Aceh 
Movement declared a unilateral ceasefire, which was (temporarily) observed by the 
government as well.  The Indonesian government also opened Aceh to foreigners, 
including the airport, which as one of the few undamaged points of entry in the region 
became a key staging area for aid distribution. Oddly enough, the situation in Sri Lanka 
then deteriorated, with the civil war continuing into 2009, while the tsunami crisis in 
Indonesia led to a lasting ceasefire and a re-integration of the rebel movement into the 
nation's body politic. 
The offer of debt relief was refused by the government of Thailand (Ford 2005), 
which would only hurt their credit rating in the future in rebuilding the lucrative tourist 
industry.  However, at an emergency summit convened in Jakarta by the UN on 6 
January, the G-7 froze debt repayment.  The summit also approved a UN call for a coastal 
warning system, similar to that already in place in the Pacific Ocean, to be implemented 
in the Indian Ocean (Reynolds 2005).  (The system was partially operational by the first 
anniversary of the tsunami.)
Global and local civil society (Cardoso Commission 2004) responded with 
alacrity. Operational NGOs such as the International Federation of Red Cross/Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC) along with national chapters, Oxfam, CARE, Médecins Sans 
Frontières, World Relief, World Vision, and Habitat for Humanity International were just 
some of the transnational groups that responded immediately, sending teams to assess 
needs and damage.  In fact, the IFRC and World Vision were the largest single recipients 
and dispensers of humanitarian aid (Kamran 2007). The UN system—especially the 
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World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF—was particularly active and well-placed to 
assess immediate needs and to react and rely on previous partnerships with local NGOs. 
For example, in Tamil Nadu, in southern India, Oxfam relied on the Women’s Collective 
and the Association for Rural Women’s Education and Liberation (Kremmer 2004). 
The corporate world responded as well.  Some of the reported examples included 
Mattel, whose foundation gave $250,000 to Save the Children. Citigroup allocated $3 
million to the Red Cross, local relief organizations, and long-term rebuilding. Microsoft 
sent $220,000 to six Indian first-responder organizations; and by 4 January it had 
committed $2 million in cash to local and international relief organizations while its 
employees had contributed $700,000.  Amazon.com became a fund-raising auxiliary for 
charities.  Johnson & Johnson sent nine “disaster relief modules,” which are big 
containers filled with kits to care for wounds, pain relievers, sutures and personal care 
products through AmeriCares.  Concern about accountability and transparency has led to 
increased monitoring of employer matching programs. Many other transnational 
companies, like IBM, responded through local offices and affiliates to calls from local 
officials within 24 hours for help from the companies’ crisis response teams to create 
command centers; by early January IBM had allocated $1 million in cash and services to 
relief.  According to one news media report, “Governments have been relying heavily on 
nongovernmental organizations and corporations to provide money, logistical help and 
expertise in the affected countries” (Stephenson and Strom 2005). 
Individuals from around the world responded with overwhelming generosity.  As 
the scale of the disaster grew, many transnational organizations reported that so many 
people were donating via the Internet that their servers could not handle the overload, 
over $3 billion. Neither the tsunami nor the response network respected borders, as 
individuals joined states, IGOs and NGOs in aggregating and channeling funds to 
recipients in the region (Kamran 2007).  It was possible to trace over $2 million back to 
the New York area alone—likely the result of three factors: New Yorkers had the money, 
were likely to have personal ties to the region, and most live on islands (OCHA Table A 
11 July 2006).
The agencies of the UN system did not remain idle either.  For example, the WFP, 
the world’s largest supplier of emergency food aid, reacted within two days in Sri Lanka. 
However, their response in Aceh was hampered because the civil war had prevented pre-
positioning aid in Indonesia (Blenford 2004). UNICEF was particularly active because 
children were especially affected because of their helplessness and vulnerability after 
losing parents.
On 29 December, the United States announced that it was forming a “core group” 
to coordinate aid delivery with the governments of Japan, Australia, and Indonesia.  This 
announcement was met with widespread dismay, as it was feared that the main effect 
would be duplication of effort and chaos.  NGOs in particular pleaded with Washington 
to let the UN remain in the lead and coordinated aid delivery (Oxfam 2004).  Through the 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the world organization 
had been coordinating the relief effort across the twelve most affected countries. 
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OCHA’s “Situation Reports” were posted daily and gathered country-by-country 
data with such useful information as a situation summary, requirements, including a 
breakdown of provision by sector, agency, and dollar amount, the UN’s response, and the 
national response.  Through its ReliefWeb Internet site, OCHA was able to inform the 
world both what survivors’ immediate needs were, what was being done to meet those 
needs, and the help aid workers required, such as transportation and communications 
equipment.  For instance, when it became apparent that the infrastructure was too 
damaged to allow aid workers to reach victims, the United States was contacted to donate 
what were most needed, helicopters and pilots.  And the same lack of infrastructure 
hampered communications, prompting Ericsson to donate satellite telephones.  The 
United Nations had proved its mettle; several days after it was announced, the US “core 
group” was quietly disbanded.  
Network Measurements
All calculations were performed with Ucinet 6 and all images were created using 
Netdraw (Borgatti, et al. 2002).  The compulsory power network consisted of 2,107 
records of financial transactions among 505 distinct actors.  These actors were states, 
IGOs, NGOs, companies, academic institutions, municipalities, news media 
organizations, and private individuals, with a reserve category of “unspecified” for those 
that could not be traced via web search.  The institutional power network consisted of 
2,504 records of cooperative interactions among 234 distinct actors, in the following 
categories: state, IGO, NGO, academic institution, company, state-owned company, 
multiple (indicating an organization with multiple types of actors acting as one), and 
private individual.
Compulsory Power Network
Manipulation of the layout for this network initially used spring embedding, 
distances plus node repulsion, and started from a Gower metric scaling layout in order to 
exaggerate the clustering.  This gives a graph that suggests interesting things about the 
nature of global cooperation.  The length of the ties indicates the value; the shorter the 
length, the more money changed hands.  The relationship between private individuals and 
NGOs is close and hierarchical; individuals are far more likely to aggregate their 
donations in NGOs.  However, the picture is very different for cooperation between other 
actors. 
[insert Figure 1 here]
The network created by the flows of resources could be separated into its 
principle components: donors of funds, aggregators of funds, and channels for funds into 
the region.    This image plots the transnational aid flows by type of actor.  The actors, 
which are colored according to a priori differences in organizational type (black for 
NGOs, dark blue for states, etc.) are grouped according to structural similarity.  That is, 
those that received money from one set of actors and gave money to another set of actors 
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are thus approximately structurally equivalent: they performed similar functions in the 
network, even though they are different types of organizations. 
The most interesting point gained from the analysis of the dataset (from the 
International Relations perspective) is found in the “structural equivalence” measure. 
Structural equivalence is the property of having the same ties to the same actors.  There 
are five principle components in this network: 1. the private donors; 2. the IFRC; 3. 
World Vision; 4. a component with mostly NGOs, a few states and IGOs, and academic 
institutions; 5. a component with mostly states, and some IGOs and NGOs, companies, 
news and media organizations, municipalities, and unspecified institutions. Significantly, 
actor positions in the network did not depend on their attributes: different types of actors 
played similar roles, which is depicted in Figure 2.
[insert Figure 2 here]
These components demonstrate that different types of organizations are 
performing similar functions in international relations in at least the circumstances of 
human security.  Actors in component #4 (the upper region of density on the 
dendrogram) seem to have been more of a destination for donor money as the 
organizations that spent in the region, while those in component #5 (the lower region of 
density) appear to have played a stronger role in aggregation.
These results seem to match the predictions that constructivists would make, 
especially in light of the vast imbalance in the values of the donations.  In this case, then, 
the clustering suggests that most of the resources were in the hands of nonstate actors, 
bolstering the constructivist argument about their importance, and suggesting that 
blockmodeling may find positions that are structurally similar.
Density in a valued network is a measure indicating the total of all values divided 
by the number of ties possible in the network. When considering the entire range of 
monetary donations from OCHA’s Table A, it emerged that even with comparatively 
small amounts at stake, organizations played multiple roles, in many instances 
aggregating donations from both private actors and from states before passing them on, 
either to a transnational NGO or an IGO.  The density of the entire network 
(dichotomized) was 0.9346.  
Closeness centrality, or the shortest paths to all other actors cannot be measured, 
because the graph is disconnected (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 200).  However, degree 
centrality, or the number of direct connections an actor has, can be measured.  In a 
directed graph, the degree centrality of the actors can be given in in-degrees and out-
degrees, indicating prestigious actors by the number of choices they received, or in-
degrees (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 170).   Since the data is also valued, the degrees 
consist of the sum of the values of their in-coming and out-going ties.  However, degree 
centrality for valued data cannot be given as a normalized value for the purposes of 
comparison.  For the compulsory relation network, the actors with the highest outdegrees 
are given in Table 1, and the actors with the highest indegrees are given in Table 2. 
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Table 1: Outdegree in the Compulsory Power Relation Network
Actor Degree Type of Actor
Private (individual donations) 41287.000 Private
United States of America 31309.000 State
United Kingdom 30713.000 State
European Commission 
Humanitarian Aid Office
30307.000 State
       
Table 2: Indegree in the Compulsory Power Relation Network
Actor Degree Type of Actor
International Federation of the 
Red Cross/Red Crescent
62388.000 IGO
International Organization for 
Migration
24894.000 IGO
Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs
20241.000 IGO
World Health Organization 18439.000 IGO
Private donations headed the list for outdegree.  The list of highest indegree actors 
reflects the aggregating function that the IFRC plays internationally, similar to the way 
the American Red Cross aggregated private donations from people in the U.S (Kamran 
2007).  Indegree measures number of ties sent, not the strength of those ties – the 
monetary value of the IFRC’s indegrees was not as high as that for the American Red 
Cross.
That there is no co-incidence between actors with high indegrees and actors with 
high outdegrees suggests that the network was highly differentiated by function: some 
actors were receivers of funds, which were then funneled to others for spending. This is 
not what standard realist theory would predict.  Furthermore, these functions were not a 
property of the type of actor.  This result cannot be accounted for by either realism or 
liberal institutionalism.  However, both can be accounted for by the constructivist school.
There are no cliques in a bipartite graph, as there are no nodes that are maximally 
connected, so other measures of finding cohesive subgroups had to be employed.  The 
average distance between reachable pairs is 1.000, but the distance-based cohesion of the 
graph is 1.000, out of a range from 0 to 1 (larger values indicate greater cohesiveness). 
The transitivity of the network, indicating that every time there is a relation between i and 
j and between j and k, then there is also a relation between i and k (Wasserman and Faust 
1994), is 90.86%.
These measures indicate that the network is cohesive.  The measure of 
cohesiveness therefore likely means that the network was good at aggregating smaller 
sums, while the largest donations were spent without much coordination. This result has 
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implications for effectiveness at responding to a security event: networks that are not 
cohesive are less likely to communicate well, and should therefore be more likely to 
duplicate efforts and waste resources.  That this actually happened has since been 
confirmed by evidence from post-action reviews (Telford, et al. 2006).
Institutional Relation Network
The disaster showed what the UN could do in terms of filling the institutional 
gaps.  Because the world organization had standing operating agreements with almost all 
of the governments, civil society actors, and other organized groups, it was able not only 
to fill the gap in knowledge about what had happened and what was needed where, but it 
was also able to incorporate new actors when they came on the scene: thousands of 
individuals spontaneously created relief groups whose action needed to be directed 
usefully (Global Surf News 2005).  In the network of institutional power relations, the 
UN is a cutpoint, while no member of the “core group” was, as demonstrated by Figure 3.
[insert Figure 3 here]
The cutpoints are the UN, the World Health Organization (WHO), Maldives, 
Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia.  It is likely that Washington’s proposed “core group” 
would have resulted in a very different network.  The most central actors, for example, 
would have been the bilateral aid agencies of states rather than private donors, 
transnational NGOs, and transnational IGOs. And it is likely that the network would have 
had a different hierarchical structure, with the bilateral aid agencies at the center and all 
others on the periphery.  
The average density of the network is 1.0056, with a standard deviation of 0.0748. 
This is difficult to interpret—as this is not a valued graph, I am not sure why I am getting 
this number.  The graph is not completely connected, so the density measure should not 
even be one, let alone over one.
The measures of both degree and closeness centrality of the top ten actors in the 
network appear in Tables 3 and 4:
Table 3: Degree Centrality in the Institutional Power Relation Network
Name Degree 
Centrality
Type of Actor
UN 93.562 IGO
Indonesia 55.365 State
Sri Lanka 52.490 State
Thailand 36.052 State
US 35.193 State
World Bank 34.335 IGO
Asian Development Bank
Australia (tie)
33.906 IGO
State
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India
Japan (tie)
33.047 State
State
IFRC 32.189 NGO
Maldives 29.614 State
Table 4: Closeness Centrality in the Institutional Power Relation Network
Name Closeness 
Centrality
Type of Actor
UN 93.952 IGO
Indonesia 69.139 State
Sri Lanka 67.930 State
Thailand 60.995 State
US 60.677 State
Australia
World Bank (tie)
60.207 State
IGO
Asian Development Bank 60.052 IGO
India 59.897 State
Japan 59.744 State
Maldives 58.690 State
There is a mix of actors for both measures of centrality, although the cast does 
undergo some changes in membership.  In both cases, the countries most greatly affected 
by the tsunami are present, as well as the UN, the US, Australia, Japan, and the financial 
branch of the international community (as represented by the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank) are present.  For degree centrality, it is interesting to note the key 
role of a transnational nongovernmental organization, the International Federation of the 
Red Cross/Red Crescent (IFRC) in coordinating humanitarian aid activities.  However, 
for closeness centrality, the IFRC does not make it into the top ten.  These measures 
indicate both the importance of the US idea of a core group, as these countries’ services 
were essential to the response; as well as why the idea was dismissed—they were 
essential, but not the most central to the response.
The network’s measure of transitivity is 100.00%, indicating that cooperation was 
very close, even more cohesive than in the compulsory power network.
Comparison to The Past: The Krakatau Eruption of 1883
The provision of emergency supplies to affected populations was available almost 
immediately, reflecting a long-standing global moral commitment to react quickly and 
generously in the face of natural disasters. As people in the affected regions began 
calling, texting, and uploading images and movies, massive relief began. In a natural 
disaster, the acceptance of outside humanitarian action was virtually automatic, which is 
not the case in wars because aid can be seen to be benefiting the enemy rather than the 
common good. Humanitarianism can be traced from the major world religions through 
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Cicero, medieval philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas, father of international law Hugo 
Grotius, and liberal peace philosopher Immanuel Kant. 
As a codified modern international institutionalized response, humanitarianism 
can be traced back to the Battle of Solferino (1859), when Henri Dunant’s actions led to 
the formation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, to his lobbying for 
Napoleon III to proclaim the rights of the wounded, and to the 1864 Geneva Convention. 
This modern commitment generally spread outward from its European origins, slowly 
encompassing disasters befalling non-European peoples.  Norm evolution since then has 
both sought to constrain state actions and enable international succor for natural and 
many human-made disasters (Weiss and Collins 2000). In the case of the tsunami, we 
have seen that “competitive compassion” resulted in what many even saw as excess 
resources for the tsunami victims. 
When the volcanic island in the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra exploded 
on August 27, 1883, the world's response was markedly different.  In the words of an 
eyewitness to the lava storms and the waves:
It was while we were thus enveloped in darkness that the stones and 
cinders discharged by the mountain began to fall upon the ship.  In a short 
time the canvas awning and the deck were covered with ashes and stones, 
to the depth of two feet, and all our available men were employed in 
removing the falling mass, which would otherwise have sunk the 
ship...While we were engaged in this struggle, and enveloped in the sheer 
blackness of a veritable hell, a new and terrible danger came upon us.  This 
was the approach of the tidal wave caused by the final eruption, which 
occurred about 12.30 to 1 p.m.  The wave reached us at 2 p.m. or 
thereabouts, and made the ship tumble like a sea-saw...When we reached 
Angier we found no trace – not a splinter of wood nor a fraction of stone -- 
of the buildings of that once flourishing seaport. (Worsfold 1893).
The tsunamis that resulted from Krakatoa's eruption killed more than 36,000 people 
(Winchester 2003).  
However, Indonesia at that time was a possession of the Dutch government. 
Having endured colonization by both the Dutch and British East India trading companies 
as well as changes in sovereignty dependent on the changes in fortunes of various 
European empires, the people of the area were in a state of rebellion.  In particular, the 
“culture system” required villages in the Dutch East Indies to set aside 20% of their crops 
for taxes which provided fabulous profits for the Dutch but no public improvements or 
services of any kind for the villagers (Worsfold 1893, Winchester 2003).   This system 
did not end until 1871.
The current round of globalization, spurred by innovations such as the railroad 
and the telegraph spread the details of the disaster to the world.  But the global response 
was more to the spectacular sunsets caused by the pollutants in the atmosphere than to the 
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human suffering (Altick 1960).  According to Winchester's account, the primary response 
of the other naval superpower of the day was to ensure that the international shipping 
lanes remained open (Winchester 2003).  Such perceived callous disregard on the part of 
others fueled an already-angry brand of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, especially 
the popularity of religious leaders such as the Sufi mystic Hajji Abdul Karim, who 
preached of the imminent arrival of the Mahdi.  The Dutch, despite their large relief 
operations, were in uneasy control in Java and Sumatra.  Winchester writes that the 
eruption of Krakatoa may thus have sparked the Banten Peasants' Revolt in 1888, a 
prominent milestone on the way to Indonesian independence.
In contrast to the past, while criticism was leveled at poor management of relief 
funds (accompanied by fears that long-term support would dwindle), the basic goal of 
averting a second crisis was achieved.  In particular, the UN and others moved to address 
the democratic deficits of disaster recovery by appointing an independent auditor.  In 
February 2005 the auditor’s task was taken on by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 
(TEC), a non-profit multi-agency learning and accountability initiative from across the 
humanitarian sector, including the UN system, donor nations, and transnational NGOs. 
The stated task was to ensure that the more than $6.7 billion that was pledged for 
humanitarian aid (Stamp 2005) actually reached the intended recipients.  Corruption and 
leakage were often problems in such previous disasters as Hurricane Mitch in Central 
America or the earthquake in Bam, Iran (BBC News 2005).  As of January 2007, TEC 
found that the funding was unusually transparent, generous, speedy, and from non-
government sources (Telford, et al. 2006). However, much of the aid and accountability 
available for this unusual blockbuster natural disaster are absent in less visible 
emergencies of all types. 
Conclusion
This project makes clearer the existing relationships between actors, thus 
suggesting areas in which improvements can be made.  It also shows that the structure of 
the network makes a difference in how effective it is in meeting the threat it was created 
to resolve.  The pattern of cooperation that emerged in this investigation indicates that 
this is an important area for study in the field of international relations.  By using the 
techniques of social network analysis, it is possible not only to verify the hypothesis that 
nonstate actors are important in world politics, but also to quantify much more precisely 
just how important they are.  This ability is an important step in fleshing out a theory of 
international relations that is capable of dealing with more than one type of actor. 
The findings and analysis of the compulsory relation confirm the hypothesis that 
nonstate actors can be as or more important than states in the right context. The actors 
with the largest indegrees and outdegrees (number of donations) were more likely to be 
nonstate actors such as NGOs and IGOs than states.  Analysis of the components showed 
that actors with different attributes played similar structural roles in the network, 
demonstrating that international politics is even more complex than most realize: it is not 
possible to tell an organization’s position from attributes such as sovereignty or source of 
funding alone.  Context is more important than the leading mainstream international 
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relations theories allow: framing the issue as one of human security allows the 
participation of a greater range of actors in more varied roles.  Even more importantly, 
organizations of different types played structurally equivalent roles in the same network, 
meaning that the actor’s attributes do not predict its role, even given a particular context.
The findings and analysis for the institutional power relation look more like what 
one would expect from the predictions of liberal institutionalism than of constructivism. 
An IGO, the UN, was the most central actor, and states were vital to the coordination 
process.  NGOs both local and transnational played a more peripheral role in this network 
than in the compulsory power relation.  This bears out the liberal institutionalist 
hypothesis that IGOs play a major role in international relations precisely because of their 
ability to marshal expertise is institutionalized (Goldstein and Keohane 1993).
The two networks are not exactly comparable; the former is valued and directed, 
while the latter is neither.  However, comparison in relative terms is still useful, and 
shows us that while nonstate actors were important in both networks, they were more 
important for funding than for coordination.  In human security then, different types of 
actors are likely to occupy different positions of structural power.
For Further Research
The response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 was anomalous—
unlike most appeals for humanitarian aid from the U.N., it was over-funded.  A nice side 
effect for social scientists of the globalization about which we theorize is the amount of 
data that is now available to us for empirical study.  Future research using SNA on the 
tsunami response should look at several things, such as extending the analysis to the 
“destination” category to further map the money trail; adding a relation for information-
sharing in order to include organizations that gave manpower and expertise rather than 
goods or money; and adding the element of time in order to see and compare the 
dynamics of this network to others.  
In particular, the records of donations for those other appeals should also be 
subjected to similar analyses: the networks should be mapped and differences noted.  For 
example, does it make a difference for the network structure if the human security 
situational framework is the result of a natural disaster, a conflict, or a complex 
emergency?   Complex emergencies are characterized by extensive violence and loss of 
life; massive displacements of people; widespread damage to societies and economies; 
the need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance; the hindrance or 
prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints; and 
significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas (OCHA 1999). 
The psalm quoted at the beginning of this paper clearly differentiates between acts of 
God and acts of man—does humanitarianism also make the distinction?  In other words, 
what is the role of human agency in the context in which the response is embedded? 
These networks should also be mapped against networks from the more traditional side of 
security, such as military alliances. 
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It would also be interesting to compare transnational networks with national and 
local disaster response networks.  The findings here, which emphasize the role of the UN, 
states, and large transnational charities, disagree with those from a study of the network 
of responders in the World Trade Center disaster, which found that emergent 
coordination was more likely (Petrescu-Prahova and Butts 2005).  Are there economies 
of scale when responding to disasters?  It would of interest to generate time series data 
from the raw data, allowing the study of network dynamics.  For example, do these 
security networks exhibit phase transitions or explosive percolation (Achlioptas, et al. 
2009) in their growth?
Since obtaining complete data is unlikely in the social sciences, the total response 
networks should also be estimated using Bayes’s Theorem.  With more complete 
information, additional methods such as game theory could be useful in developing 
predictive theory, such as determining an actor’s options and probable course of 
behavior, given a particular network structure.
Finally, there is a real need to expand the ability to manipulate multimode data. 
For this analysis, having additional modes available would allow the extension of the 
analysis to consider the source of the private individual donations and the destinations of 
the funds within the affected region.  It is quite likely that social scientists investigating 
other phenomena such as complex emergencies will also encounter multiple modes of 
data: wars and their combatants and suppliers, disasters and their internally displaced 
people and refugees, states, NGOs, IGOs, and so on.  Measures of multimode network 
data should be developed and incorporated into network analysis software.
Social network analysis also allows us to capture an Olympian view of global 
relationships in a comprehensive way.  Global governance can be imagined as a cloud of 
actors interacting—or not—on every conceivable global issue.  In depicting the entire 
network, it is like taking a slice through the cloud, like an MRI takes a picture of a slice 
of the human body.  These slices can then be compared, or put in sequence.  Comparing 
other security networks using the same power relations should give much more insight 
into their functioning.
The first step in building a network theory of international relations is to embrace 
the idea that other actors, beyond the state, are more prevalent in world politics than 
realist and liberal institutionalist theories have previously suggested.  Therefore, it is 
imperative that scholars and others be very clear about who makes decisions, on what 
authority, and in what relation to each other.  Network structure will affect relations; we 
need more information on how it will do so.
Appendix: Coding Decisions 
The Compulsory Power Relation
The raw data for the compulsory power relation is OCHA’s “Table A:  List of all 
humanitarian pledges, commitments & contributions in 2005,” compilation as of 11 July 
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2006, showing donors, channels through which aid flowed, final destination of aid, 
description of project, and value in dollars.  Humanitarian aid is defined as “an 
intervention to help people who are victims of a natural disaster or conflict meet their 
basic needs and rights.”3  Because FTS is mandated to track all humanitarian aid, it was 
necessary for FTS’ stakeholders to develop a definition of humanitarian aid for statistical 
purposes, which serves as the criterion for posting funding information on FTS.
Again, it is important to note that these data were compiled by OCHA through 
organization self-reporting; while the information in OCHA Table A can be considered 
complete for the purposes of analyzing global networks of aid flows, using formal 
analysis techniques, there is no way to completely capture all of the humanitarian aid that 
was given in response to the tsunami, much of which was given by individuals in the 
region and never recorded.4  Furthermore, some recorders chose not to follow the 
database's standards.  China in particular failed to record a monetary value for many of its 
contributions, thus resulting in an undercount.
Changes had to be made to OCHA Table A: the uncommitted pledges column 
was deleted; as were in-kind donations without dollar values; all description information 
except destination was deleted (if destination was not given, the entry was added to the 
"Region" category); an "allocation of unearmarked funds" from an organization was 
listed as simply coming from that organization, and "bilateral" channels were listed as 
state-to-state.  
Two columns of attribute data were added to OCHA Table A: Type of Donor and 
Type of Channel, created with information from ReliefWeb. These columns listed the 
organization type as an attribute: international organization (IGO), nongovernmental 
organization (NGO), etc.  The following attribute coding decisions were made: the 
International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is listed as an 
"IGO" because ReliefWeb categorizes it as "UN & international organizations", and all 
EU agencies are listed as "state" for the same reason.  Channels that were listed as 
multiple countries or vague descriptors such as "UN Agencies, NGOs and Red Cross" 
and any acronyms not found in ReliefWeb or through Google were coded as "Region" for 
having been spent there; and their organization type was coded as “unspecified.”  Other 
organization types were NGO, state, and company.  Finally, in order to create digraphs 
that showed large flows of resource (and were understandable), all records from private 
individuals were simply aggregated and coded as “private,” as the goal of this study is to 
map transactions that crossed international borders.  What is of interest here is the 
attribute character of the donors, not their individual identity.
3 FTS Definitions-Glossary at http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/index.aspx.  More information on the criteria for 
inclusion as “humanitarian” aid versus other kinds of aid is available at http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/exception-
docs/AboutFTS/FTS_criteria_for_posting_contributions.pdf.
4 Furthermore, there is a notable lack of documentation for U.S. expenditures, such as the mobilization of 
the Lincoln carrier group out of Okinawa.  While the carrier group would have operated anyway, its 
helicopter pilots would not have flown thousands of sorties, and that cost appears to be underrepresented in 
this data set.
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Again, the raw data were three-mode, with donor individuals and organizations 
listed separately from the organizations that served as aid channels and from the ultimate 
destination of the aid.  In order to make sense of the aid flow, donors, channels, and 
destinations were recoded into two modes: sender or receiver of aid, in essence deleting 
the destination column, to create a dyadic two-mode network, but without double-
counting the channels.  This is unfortunate, because both the lost information and a visual 
representation of the destination data would have been useful theoretically.  This network 
was then transformed into a directed bipartite graph using iterative metric 
multidimensional scaling based on similarities.
The Institutional Power Relation
Information for this relation was taken from the thirty-eight OCHA Situation 
Reports written between 26 December 2004 and 29 April 2005.  Coding decisions were 
based on mining paragraphs for relationships.  For example, see this passage from 
Situation Report 25, dated 8 Feb 2005:
Planning and/or construction of temporary and semi-permanent schools is 
underway. The identification of suitable sites for semi-permanent school 
shelters is causing problems in densely populated areas, such as Ampara. 
Proposals for temporary school buildings in Paddiruppu and Batticaloa 
education zones (Batticaloa district) have been approved and work will 
start immediately. A proposal from Kalkudah for construction of semi-
permanent buildings is being considered. In Jaffna district, UNICEF has 
agreed to undertake the reconstruction of 2 schools; GTZ will be 
responsible for 6 schools and the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) 
will be responsible for 4 schools. UNICEF will support the construction of 
46 temporary modular classrooms in Maruthankerny in Jaffna district. 
These will accommodate up to 1,500 children.
In this passage about school construction, the Sri Lankan authorities, UNICEF, GTZ, and 
the Swiss Development Corporation have all worked together to provide school buildings 
while not duplicating each other’s work.
Intra-state cooperation between the various ministries and agencies was not 
recorded.  If a passage mentioned cooperation between the ministries and agencies of a 
state with another actor, it was recorded as a relationship between the state and that actor. 
The reasoning is that the purpose of this study is to examine transnational cooperation, 
not domestic institutional cooperation.  Any meetings that were mentioned in the 
situation reports were also recorded as relationships.  For example, this includes the 
regional workshop on rehabilitation of fisheries and aquaculture in coastal communities 
of tsunami affected countries in Asia, held from 28 February to 1 March 2005, in 
Bangkok, Thailand.  These meetings account for several large “clusters” in the network 
of well-connected actors.  However, it should be noted that many meetings were not 
mentioned in these situation reports, and that of the meetings mentioned, lists of 
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participants were not always available.  Also, several times the working partners were not 
named individually.  
Finally, a word or two about the UN system is in order: the various UN agencies, 
including OCHA, were recorded simply as UN.  This may have made the UN seem more 
central than it already was, given the authorship of the situation reports.  However, the 
purpose of this study is to trace transnational cooperative interactions, not intra-
organizational cooperation within the UN system.  The exceptions to this rule were the 
autonomous agencies affiliated with the UN: the World Bank group, the UN Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO).  These agencies have become part of the UN system, but most have separate 
origins, and may have staff and budgets that are not within the UN.
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